The generals of the Myanmar military regime conducted a pre-fixed general election seven months ago. While many international actors, including the United Nations, Western embassies and political analysts, called the election an act of “power grab” and attempt to legitimise its rule, some also argued that it could be used as a starting point for better politics in the country. The latter group include neighbouring countries, such as China, India, Thailand and several other members of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). In apparent confirmation, the subsequent visits to India in early June by Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the regime’s dictator-turned president, and then China in mid-June provided fresh international recognition for the long-isolated generals of the Tatmadaw (Sit-Tat) in Naypyidaw.
Less noticed, even if political sources claim that China granted a higher degree of recognition as it was termed as a “state visit” rather than “official visit” in the case of India, the latter’s engagement with the Min Aung Hlaing regime provided one very crucial asset which China cannot offer: that is, the endorsement of the new government in Naypyidaw by the world’s largest democracy, a recognition of governance which the regime wants the most. In consequence, this is thought to have had impact on the recent meeting between the foreign ministers of ASEAN and their Napyidaw counterparts, highlighted by Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Thailand.
Five years after the 2021 coup d'état, the international stage is delicately set. In the overall trends in Myanmar politics, the recent elections – despite their many deficits – can be seen to have had engagement impact on regional foreign policy re-arrangements for the regime in Napyidaw. At the same time, these developments could also mean that efforts for international acceptance led by the rival National Unity Government (NUG), established by opposition groups in the coup aftermath, could face increasing limitations.
On the domestic front, by contrast, it would be safe to argue that the recent polls have had limited impact on the overall resistance movement in the country. A largely unpopular structure of failed state governance under dominance by the Myanmar armed forces holds in only half of the country, and the recent polls were hugely illegitimate in the eyes of the majority population in the ethnic states and regions. In Arakan, only three township areas experienced elections: Sittwe, Kyaukphyu and Manaung. And now the Rakhine State government installed by the Napyidaw regime following the elections continues to face ongoing conflict in the vicinity of its capital Sittwe where the state parliament is just half a kilometer from the artillery and drone strikes of the Arakan Army (AA), the military wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA).
As these events show, the regime remains widely rejected by the people in Myanmar, and Arakan has become a leading territory where Napyidaw faces both losses of territory and legitimacy. Located on strategic geo-political crossroads and with a long history of independence, the struggle for freedom and self-determination among Arakan’s peoples has become a key model and indicator of resistance trends in the popular bid for regime change. It is also one that is being increasingly watched by neighbouring governments and the outside world.
