On June 25, 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued an important Second Amendment decision in Wolford v. Lopez. That decision may have a major impact on the pending challenge to Tennessee’s “intent to go armed” law and the “parks” gun ban in Hughes v. Lee. Hughes v. Lee is the Tennessee case that was brought by three TFA members, Gun Owners of America, and Gun Owners Foundation. The lawsuit challenges two Tennessee statutes as unconstitutional violations of the Tennessee Constitution and, through it, the 2nd Amendment and the 14th Amendment.

The first challenged statute is Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(a). That law makes it a crime to carry a firearm “with the intent to go armed.” Tennessee courts have interpreted that phrase to include carrying a firearm for either offense or defensive purposes in order to be prepared for confrontation – that is, for self-defense. That is the problem. Tennessee treats carrying a firearm as a crime first, and then forces citizens to rely on exceptions and defenses later at trial and Tennessee law places the burden on the citizen to raise those defenses and, in some instances, to carry the burden of proof.

The second statute is Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1311(a), often called the “parks” statute. On its face, that law restricts certain weapons, those listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1302(a), in public parks, playgrounds, civic centers, and other recreational areas. However, a Tennessee Attorney General Opinion concluded that the statute is broader than what it says and opined that it actually prohibits all firearms not just those prohibited in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1302(a).

The Hughes v. Lee case was filed in Gibson County Chancery Court. However, because of a statute that was enacted in the last few years, it was required to be assigned to a panel of three trial judges appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court to be heard and determined because it is a civil action seeking a declaratory ruling on the Plaintiffs’ civil rights and whether the Legislature had violated the constitutional limits on its authority by infringing those rights. The three-judge panel trial court panel ruled that both statutes are unconstitutional. The State appealed. That appeal is now pending.

One of the State’s main arguments is that these laws survive a facial constitutional challenge because there might be some possible situation where they could be applied constitutionally. That argument is based on a test used by the Supreme Court in its 1987 decision in Salerno which, at that time, put the burden in a constitutional challenge on the plaintiff to provide that there was “no set of circumstances” under which the law could be constitutionally applied. Thus, relying on Salerno, the State argues that Tennessee’s definition of “firearm” is so expansively broad that it includes things like missiles, explosives, bombs and grenades – things that normal people do not classify as firearms. The State then says that because Tennessee could ban carrying missiles, explosives, bombs and grenades, which the State asserts are not protected by the Second Amendment, the entire statute should survive.

That argument became much weaker after Wolford. In Wolford, Hawaii passed a law that made it illegal for licensed citizens to carry firearms on private property open to the public unless the property owner first gave express permission. That meant a law-abiding permit holder could be criminally prosecuted (just like in Tennessee) from carrying in many ordinary places, including stores, restaurants, gas stations, coffee shops, and other places people visit every day.

The Supreme Court struck down Hawaii’s law. The Court applied the same test it announced in Bruen. First, the Court asked whether the law affected conduct protected by the Second Amendment. Since it concluded that it did, the Court required Hawaii to prove that its law fit within America’s historical tradition of firearm regulation as that tradition existed in 1791 (the date on which the Second Amendment was adopted).

Hawaii failed that burden. That is important for Tennessee because the Supreme Court did not save Hawaii’s law by asking whether the law might have some possible valid application. It did not say, “Maybe this law could be applied to bombs, so the whole law survives.” It looked at what the law actually did to ordinary citizens trying to carry ordinary firearms for self-defense.

That matters in Hughes v. Lee.

Tennessee’s “intent to go armed” statute does not just apply to criminals. It does not just apply to people threatening others. It reaches ordinary citizens who carry firearms for self-defense. In its appellate pleadings, the State admits that some applications of Tennessee’s system are constitutionally problematic. But the State still asks the Court of Appeals to keep the statutes in place because there may be some possible constitutional applications such as carrying grenades or missiles where the law might be constitutional.

Wolford shows why that is the wrong focus.

The Second Amendment is not protected only after a citizen is arrested, charged, hires a lawyer, and raises a defense in court. A constitutional right is supposed to protect citizens before the government treats them as criminals. Of course, Tennessee’s Legislature has rejected that analysis now for decades and, in fact, it has worked against it.

That is also why Tennessee does not have true constitutional carry. A true constitutional carry state does not make carrying a firearm a crime by default and then offer defenses later. In Tennessee, the statutory scheme still says a person commits an offense by carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed – even in their own home, on their own property and in their own place of business. In Tennessee, its still a crime to carry with the intent to go armed even if you have a handgun permit. The so-called protections are layered on later as exceptions and defenses.

That is not how constitutional rights are supposed to work.

Wolford also undermines the State’s argument about local history and local policy preferences. The Supreme Court made clear that the Second Amendment has the same meaning across the United States. Hawaii could not shrink the right to bear arms based on local customs or its “Aloha” history. Tennessee cannot shrink it either.

That point is important because the State relies on selected pieces of Tennessee history and later park regulations to defend the challenged statutes. But under Bruen and Wolford, the government must show a national historical tradition. Isolated local rules, late historical examples, or policy arguments about what the government thinks is safer are not enough. Indeed, Bruen expressly rejected the ability of a state to argue “but public safety” as a justification.

Wolford is also important for the “parks” statute. The Supreme Court did not decide whether all public parks are sensitive places. That issue was not directly before the Court. But the decision still gives guidance. The Court rejected weak historical analogies and warned against relying on outlier rules that were not widespread or accepted. That matters because the State’s defense of Tennessee’s parks statute depends heavily on much later park regulations and broad claims that recreational areas should be treated like schools, courthouses, polling places, or legislative assemblies (most of which are not completely prohibited in Tennessee by statute).

The right question is not whether the State can imagine a reason to call a place “sensitive.” The right question is whether history supports banning Constitutional arms in that kind of place. Wolford makes clear that the government bears that burden.

The bottom line is simple.

Wolford strengthens the position of the Hughes plaintiffs. It confirms that courts must use Bruen’s text-and-history test. It confirms that the government bears the burden. It confirms that the Second Amendment is a national constitutional right. And it shows that a broad gun control law can be struck down on its face when it severely burdens ordinary law-abiding citizens who seek to carry firearms for self-defense even if there might be hypothetical or imaginary instances where the law might apply.

TFA has said for years that Tennessee’s carry laws are not true constitutional carry. Hughes v. Lee is about forcing Tennessee officials to respect the actual constitutional right, not a watered-down version controlled by criminal statutes, exceptions, and defenses. Even more, Hughes v. Lee is a civil rights cases which squarely presents the question of whether the Tennessee Legislature has violated the constitutional limits on its authority by expressly infringing rights otherwise fully removed from its authority by the people through their constitutional denial of authority.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Wolford does not automatically decide the Hughes appeal. But it gives the Tennessee Court of Appeals fresh and powerful guidance. If Tennessee’s laws criminalize the ordinary carrying of firearms for self-defense, then the State must prove that those laws match America’s historical tradition as of 1791. The three-judge trial court panel concluded that the State did not carry that burden.

Political slogans are not enough. Hypotheticals about bombs and grenades are not enough. Local preferences are not enough. The Constitution is the standard. The facts are clear that first, Tennessee’s Legislature has violated its constitutional authority by enacting these laws, and second, that Tennessee’s current Republican controlled Legislature has collectively violated its oath of office by refusing to repeal these statutes.