Rep. Chris Todd is the House Sponsor of House Bill 2064 which seeks to making several changes to Tennessee’s criminal statutes that regulate firearms possession or use. This House bill was entirely amended on March 11, 2026, (the proposed amendment was not published under the bill’s history on the state website). The amended bill passed on party lines in the House Criminal Justice Subcommittee. Senator Paul Bailey is the Senate Sponsor of the companion bill, SB2467, which at this point is not scheduled for consideration by Senate Judiciary.

To be certain, Tennessee Firearms Association is favorable to some objectives of the bill such as the provisions which seek to repeal two clearly unconstitutional state laws. See, e.g., Sections 1 and 3 of the amended bill. In August 2025, a Tennessee three-judge trial court unanimously ruled that those Tennessee’s gun control statutes – Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(a) (the “Going Armed Statute”) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1311(a) (the “Parks Statute”) – violated the Tennessee Constitution as well as the Second Amendment.   

Indeed, in his presentation of the amended bill to the subcommittee on March 11, 2026, Representative Todd indicated that part of the objective of the bill was to render moot the pending litigation (the state has appealed the trial court’s ruling) on the constitutionality of these two statutes.

However, Rep. Todd’s amendment raises some concerns that it continues to have potentially serious constitutional problems which could result in yet more litigation if it passes without further amendment.

While some portions of the amendment appear to eliminate Tennessee’s “intent to go armed” provision and even broaden lawful carry in parks and other places, the most troubling features of the bill are not its pro-carry provisions. The deeper problem is that the amendment adds or revises criminal firearm restrictions in ways that may be vulnerable under the Second Amendment and under the Due Process Clause’s void-for-vagueness doctrine.

The constitutional concerns are concentrated in two areas. First, the bill appears to expand criminal liability involving firearms without showing the “Bruen Basis” which requires that any such laws be consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation as of 1791. Thus, it violates the historical tradition or analogue tests as required by Bruen and reaffirmed in Rahimi. Second, the bill uses broad, elastic terms that may leave ordinary citizens guessing what conduct is criminal and may invite selective enforcement.

The language of the amended bill and indeed the positions taken by certain administrative (e.g., TBI and TDOS) or other law enforcement agencies clearly disregard the requirements of Bruen. Under Bruen, when the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the regulated conduct, the government must justify its restriction by proving it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation as it existing in the states as of 1791. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected interest balancing and modern public-policy justifications as substitutes for historical proof. Rahimi did not abandon that framework; it reaffirmed that the government must identify a historical analogue that is relevantly similar in its why and how. Thus, comments from law enforcement, administrative agencies and even some legislators about “public safety” – a classic interest balancing argument – are irrelevant.

That matters here because this amendment is not merely housekeeping. It creates or broadens firearm-related offenses, changes existing statutory language from narrower terms to broader ones, and adds a new public-place offense for having, carrying, or exhibiting a firearm in the presence of others in an “alarming, careless, angry, or threatening manner,” when not in necessary self-defense. That new offense appears in Section 21 of the amendment.

Once Tennessee criminalizes conduct involving the bearing of arms, the burden is on the State to prove a historical tradition supporting that restriction. That is where certain provisions of this amendment fail.

Section 21 of the amendment adds a new subsection making it a criminal offense if a person has, carries, or exhibits a firearm in a public place, in the presence of one or more persons, in an “alarming, careless, angry, or threatening manner,” when not in necessary self-defense. What does that mean?

The “threatening” portion of that language will likely be the easiest for the State to defend, because true threats, menacing behavior, and conduct amounting to terrorizing or breach-of-the-peace type behavior have historically been subject to regulation. Indeed, such conduct is likely already a criminal offense that could be prosecuted as an assault. Why the need for duplication? The sponsor does not say.

But the bill does not stop with conduct that would already be subject to prosecution as an assault. It also criminalizes firearm-related conduct described as “alarming,” “careless,” or “angry.” Those terms are much broader and much less definite.

From a Second Amendment perspective, that breadth matters. A law aimed at true threats or violent intimidation may have a plausible basis as supported by the nation’s historical tradition (but not necessarily since what was deemed non-criminal in 1791 could be subject to prosecution under this law). However, a language in a proposed law aimed at conduct that merely causes alarm to an observer, or that an officer later characterizes as careless or angry, is much harder to tie to a well-established historical tradition that Bruen requires.

This is especially important because carrying arms in public is conduct within the Second Amendment’s text. If the State seeks to punish non-self-defensive public carry based on imprecise behavioral descriptions thrown recklessly into statutory form, it must show more than a generalized history of regulating misuse. It must show a clearly established national tradition as of 1791 that is sufficiently analogous to this law’s actual scope. That showing may be difficult if the statute reaches conduct well short of threats, assaults, or deliberate intimidation. And, again, the sponsor does not explain the Bruen basis for this change in the law.

The Supreme Court has long held that a criminal statute is unconstitutional if it fails to define the offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, or if it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. That standard creates a substantial problem for terms used in the amendment like “alarming,” “careless” and “angry.”

What counts as “alarming” when a firearm is present in a public place? Alarm to whom? A hostile bystander? An inexperienced observer? A political opponent? An anti-gun complainant? The term appears to depend heavily on the reaction of others rather than on an objectively defined act by the carrier.

“Careless” presents a similar problem. Does it mean negligent handling? Failure to use a holster? Touching or adjusting a visible firearm? Printing through clothing? Openly carrying in a tense public setting? The amendment does not define the term.

“Angry” is also problematic. Citizens may be upset, frustrated, loud, or involved in a heated verbal dispute without making threats or engaging in unlawful violence. Indeed, some citizens just look and sound angry to observers but that outward appearance is just their natural disposition. A criminal statute that turns on whether an officer perceives a carrier as “angry” creates obvious notice and enforcement concerns.

A well-drafted criminal firearms statute ordinarily focuses on objective conduct: pointing, brandishing, threatening, unlawfully displaying, recklessly endangering, or otherwise engaging in clearly defined acts. This amendment instead uses subjective descriptors that can expand or contract based on the perceptions of witnesses, officers, prosecutors, or jurors. That is the kind of indeterminacy that vagueness doctrine is designed to prevent. Indeed, criminal statutes that turn on subjective governmental assessments are one of the reasons that the Supreme Court addressed and found unconstitutional in Bruen.

Vagueness doctrine is concerned not only with notice, but with the scope of enforcement discretion. A law that lets government officials decide after the fact whether conduct was “alarming” or “angry” is a law that risks unequal application.

That danger is magnified in the firearms context. Open carriers, permitless carriers, activists, and politically unpopular speakers may all face uneven enforcement depending on the local culture, the officer involved, the neighborhood, or the reactions of bystanders. [In practice, this kind of statute can become a tool for selective enforcement against constitutionally protected bearing of arms by otherwise lawful citizens. Indeed, we already know that state agencies and law enforcement generally oppose the bill – should those opponents be vested with discretionary authority that would allow them to stop, detain, question or even arrest people that they subjectively classify as alarming, careless or angry?

Converting narrower firearm terms into broader ones creates additional Second Amendment risks

The amendment repeatedly changes statutory language from “handgun” to “firearm.” It also revises several carry-related sections to apply more broadly to persons “not prohibited from carrying a firearm.”

Sometimes that broader terminology may benefit lawful carriers. But in criminal sections, broadening the term from handgun to firearm expands the possible reach of the offense. That broader reach contained in the amendment matters because the State under Bruen must justify the actual scope of the regulation, not a narrower hypothetical version of it. Again, the sponsor did not address the Bruen basis and it is not self apparent from the amendment itself.

The more the amendment extends criminal liability from handguns to all firearms, the more likely it is to sweep in constitutionally protected conduct involving long guns that historically were common, lawful, and often especially protected in rural and agricultural life.

Although the central problems with this amendment are the new criminal standards and the vagueness issue, the juvenile provisions remain significant.

The amendment revises Tennessee Code sections on juvenile possession including changing several provisions from “handgun” to “firearm.” It also provides a list of specific exceptions for juveniles involving rifles and shotguns, such as possession at the juvenile’s residence, while protecting livestock, if emancipated (a possible equal protection violation), or in certain circumstances for unloaded firearms in situations involving vehicles or boats. It further provides an exception when a firearm is supplied to a minor for hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, sport shooting, or another lawful sporting activity.

Structurally, this appears to move Tennessee toward a default rule of prohibition a complete firearm prohibition on possession of firearms, with enumerated affirmative defenses or exceptions, rather than a broader background assumption that has existed in Tennessee generally since its founding in 1796 (and before) that minors may lawfully access long guns in many ordinary rural, family, training, and sporting settings. That shift could materially reduce longarm access currently available to those under 18 and such reduction may given rise to yet another constitutional challenge (particularly since at the time of the Founding the militia laws in several states imposed armed militia duties on those as young as 16).

Thus, these sweeping changes raise Second Amendment questions because the historical tradition surrounding youth and firearms is not one of categorical disarmament. Early American practice included minors and young men using firearms for hunting, militia-related activity, training, and ordinary life. Whether modern legislatures may impose broader categorical restrictions on those under 18 is a serious constitutional question, and the answer under Bruen depends on historical analogues, not legislative preference nor the belief that doing so is solely within the boundless discretion of legislators.

To advance a broad modern limitation on juvenile longarm possession may be subject to constitutional challenges unless the State can show founding-era regulations or analogues close enough in purpose and method to satisfy Bruen and Rahimi.

The amendment rewrites Tennessee Code § 39-17-1321 to make it an offense to carry a firearm with intent to go armed while under the influence of intoxicants or at or above 0.08% blood or breath alcohol concentration. That part of the restriction that is based on objective data (blood tests) might be easier to apply because it is not subjective. However, the drafters did not stop there. Instead, they included a clearly subjective standard that purports to criminalize possession if the person is “under the influence of any intoxicant, marijuana, controlled substance, controlled substance analogue, drug, substance affecting the central nervous system, or combination thereof that impairs the person’s ability to safely carry a firearm by depriving the person of the clearness of mind and control of oneself that the person would otherwise possess.” That statement is overwhelmingly burdened with subjectively vague concepts such as ‘a person’s ability’ to safely carry a firearm and whether than impairment is caused by depriving the person of the “clearness of mind” or the ability to control oneself that a “person would otherwise possess.” That concept lacks any objective standard at all. Indeed, compared with the “alarming, careless, angry, or threatening manner” provision, this part of the bill likely stands on no firmer constitutional ground that its predecessor. Add to that, again, the complete omission by the sponsor of any data establishing a Bruen required showing of a national historical tradition completely banning intoxicated individuals from possessing firearms. 

Indeed, many would argue that as of 1791, a great number of individuals including those in militia service were often consuming alcohol if not at least intoxicated to the standards that the amendment’s language imposes.

The most serious defects in this amendment are structural and constitutional.

The new public-place offense is vulnerable because it appears to regulate protected bearing of arms using broad and subjective terms (e.g., “careless” or “angry”) rather than narrowly defined, historically grounded categories.

The law is exposed under the Second Amendment because Bruen requires Tennessee to prove a historical tradition supporting restrictions of this actual breadth.

The law is exposed under vagueness doctrine because words like “alarming,” “careless,” and “angry” do not clearly tell ordinary citizens what is forbidden and may invite arbitrary enforcement by police and prosecutors.

The juvenile provisions remain a constitutional concern because the amendment appears to narrow longarm access for those under 18 by shifting toward a prohibition-with-affirmative defenses model that may not fit the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

The statute does portend to do two things that the TFA has urged for decades – the repeal of unconstitutional provisions such as “intent to go armed” and making “parks” gun-free zones. But, the overbreadth of the amendment invites future constitutional litigation and it likely to prevail. Perhaps, just perhaps, that is why other Republicans are pushing legislation like SB1958/HB1971 which would deny citizens the opportunity to bring constitutional challenges to such laws.

In plain terms, this amendment appears to create the kind of modern, discretionary, and elastic firearm offense that courts should distrust after Bruen. Tennessee can punish true threats, assaults, reckless endangerment, and criminal misuse of firearms. But [Inference] this amendment goes further and risks criminalizing ordinary citizens based on vague impressions and subjective reactions. That is a dangerous way to legislate in any area. In the area of constitutional rights, it is worse.

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