The Arakan Army's Struggle For Regional Sovereignty

Although the recent deadly earthquake, with a magnitude of 7.7 and centred near the towns of Sagaing and Mandalay in central Myanmar, was a natural disaster, the country’s ongoing political crisis will inevitably and unfortunately exacerbate the tragedy’s negative consequences. The early death toll, as confirmed by some credible sources on 3 April 2025, exceeds 2,000, and this figure is highly likely to rise in the coming days. Despite the National Unity Government (NUG), a key opposition group, announcing a two-week unilateral ceasefire on 29 March, armed clashes still erupted in several locations, accompanied by continued junta airstrikes.  

Additionally on 1 April, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3 BHA), which consists of the key ethnic armed forces of the Arakan Army (AA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), released a joint statement announcing the cessation of a 30-day military offensive in their areas. The following day on 2 April, both the military regime of the State Administration Council (SAC) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) declared 22-day ceasefires.

Armed clashes and airstrikes, however, reportedly persisted in Bhamo, Indaw and Waignmaw townships of Kachin State as of 3 April. Some observers therefore criticized the SAC’s temporary ceasefire as a superficial gesture, suggesting it was primarily intended to portray themselves as ‘good guys’ to the international community by aligning with the BIMSTEC meeting held in Bangkok from 2-4 April. Notably, too, the SAC’s statement explicitly stated that they would continue attacks against opposition groups if the latter persist with ‘recruitments’ in their areas. This implies that the SAC could strike opposition groups at any time under the pretext of alleging ‘recruitments’, which the opposition typically conducts – as does the Myanmar military – during ceasefire periods.

Hopes were thus very fragile that the earthquake disaster would bring about a change in SAC policy. While many well-intentioned diplomats and observers hope for a political turning point similar to the 2004 Aceh resolution that could end the armed conflict, Myanmar’s future remains far more complex and highly uncertain.